Introduction
We give an account of the basic determinants of the courses of computation of an Infinite Time Turing machine (ITTM), a model of computation which allows for transfinitely many steps of computation. One such basic theorem relates the ordinal codes capable of being output on halting computations to those capable of being produced eventually by some non-terminating computation. This socaled "λ-ζ-Σ"-theorem is reproven here, and it is newly related to a theorem of Friedman & Harrington on the levels of the Gödel Constructible hierarchy of sets.
In a second part we provide further new results: (i) a Normal Form Theorem (corresponding to Kleene's Normal Form Theorem for standard Turing machines) in which a code for a course of computation can be produced, uniformly on all inputs, in the lengths of time close to that of the original computation; (ii) a characterization of which ordinals start gaps in the class of ordinal halting times; (iii) an example of divergence between halting points of one-tape and three-tape ITTM architecture answering a question of Hamkins and Seabold [12] . urged to consult that paper. We shall be assuming the reader has done so in order to fully understand this paper, but nevertheless we give a brief account here: the hardware of such a machine is that of a standard one-way tape of a strip of cells numbered C i |i ∈ N ; a read/write head moves in each stage one cell to the left or right (unless it is viewing C 0 in which case it may of course only move to C 1 ) upon reading and possibly changing the cell symbol, which we shall restrict here to being from an alphabet consisting of "0" and "1". (This symbol, in cell C i say, will be called the cell value, and if the cell value at time α is j ∈ {0, 1} we shall set C i (α) = j.) The software remains the standard Turing machine program, as given for example, by a transition table. The definition of [10] introduces a new state symbol q L to add to the usual finitely many states. This symbol acts simply as one new kind of state, the limit state.
The novelty is in defining a behaviour for the machine after it has possible been through stages for every finite time n. We consider stages of "time" to be given by ordinal numbers α. This is done by fiat: at time α the head is inspecting a cell, in a certain state and its action is entirely determined by the transition table -in short it behaves literally as a standard Turing machine. However at time µ where µ is a limit ordinal we must specify its action which we do as follows: the head returns to the starting cell C 0 , the machine enters state q L ; lastly we specify the cell values at limit time µ, C i (µ), by setting C i (µ) = df lim inf C i (α) | α < µ = α<µ α<β<µ C β (i).
To paraphrase: if the cell value stabilizes by stage µ then the value C i (µ) at that time is that stabilized value. Otherwise it is set to 0. (On the right equality we are using the convention that the ordinals are the von Neumann ordinals, in particular that 0 = df ∅ and 1 = df {0}.)
Variants on this straightforward model are possible: one may specify that the value of a cell is blank at a limit time µ, whenever the cell value had changed value unboundedly in the time µ (and thus have an alphabet of three symbols); one may dispense with the special state q L for limit stages µ, and demand that the machine enter into the state q i where i is the liminf of the state numbers of q j at times less than µ (this has the attractive computational feature of putting the machine, at limit stages of time, at the beginning of the outermost loop it was cycling through before µ). Finally, and this we shall adopt for this paper, just as the authors of [10] originally did, we allow for multiple tapes. We shall allow for three tapes input, scratch, and output arranged side by side, with the the read/write head viewing a triple of cells, one from each tape, simultaneously, and allowed to write likewise to all three such cells, again simultaneously, in a single step. (It is one of the differences between such 1 tape and 3 tape models that we shall investigate in this paper.) We continue to enumerate the cells in the same way however as C i |i ∈ N .
It is quite natural then to ask "to what extent do properties of the standard Turing machine model transfer to the ITTM model?".
The first obvious feature is that ITTM's not only subsume standard TM's in terms of the times they are allowed, they are in essence computing at a higher type: they can read and write infinite strings of 0's and 1's which we consider as elements of Cantor space 2 N . We identify such x, y ∈ 2 N with real numbers.
(If we wish to compute simply on integer input, we can code an integer n of course on the input tape as a 1 entered into the first n cells of the input tape, and 0's in the others.) As the programs (or transition tables etc. ) are still clearly enumerable we let P e be the e'th progam. If this program halts on input x (and with y on the output tape), we write P e (x) ↓ or (P e (x) ↓ y).
Entirely appropriate questions are:
Q1 What is: (a) {e | P e (0) ↓}; (b) { e, x | P e (x) ↓} ; (c) {y ∈ 2 N | P e (x) ↓ y} ? Q1a) and b) here are versions of the halting problem for such machines, a) of course is just b) restricted to the bottom type of integer inputs. Here c) raises the question of what reals can be computed by such machines. Definition 1 [10] A real y ∈ 2 N is called writable if ∃eP e (0) ↓ y. We say that an ordinal number α (or a set A) is writable if a code for α, or A, is writable.
(By a code for α we mean a y ∈ 2 N so that if we set n < y m ↔ y( n, m) = 1 then ω, < y ∼ = α, < ; in this case we write " y = α". A code for a transitive set A is any z ∈ N × N so that N, z ∼ = A, ∈ .) Clearly only countable ordinals and countable sets in the above sense can be writable. We let WO stand for the set of reals that code wellorderings. We may ask then:
Q2 What are the writable reals? What are the writable ordinals? Definition 2 [10] λ = df sup{α | α is a writable ordinal};
(ii) H(λ) = {A | A is a writable set}.
It is easy to see that if α is writable, then so is any β < α. (If y codes α then for some n ||y n | = β, where y n gives value 1 only to those pairs k, m where k < y m < y n; we then modify the program that outputs y to output y n instead.) The writable ordinals thus form an initial segment of the countable ordinals, and λ ⊆ H(λ). It can also be shown that H(λ) is a transitive class of sets. Considering further the computational process, we may next consider the halting times of computations P e (x) ↓ y. Hamkins and Lewis partly analysed such halting times on integer inputs. They defined:
Definition 3 [10, §3] (i) α is a clockable ordinal, if for some e P e (0) ↓ α , where the latter indicated that the computation halted in exactly α steps, that is its action at time α is to go into a halting state.
(ii) γ = df sup{α | α is clockable}.
Hamkins and Lewis proved in [10] two basic facts: (Thm 3.4) that not all ordinals below γ are clockable; (Thm 3.8) that λ ≤ γ.
Q3
What are the clockable ordinals? Does λ = γ? That is, are all clockables writable?
Hamkins and Lewis pursued the Turing machine model by analysing appropriate notions of ITTM-degree corresponding to Turing degrees, and provided a wealth of results. It is the view (with the benefit of hindsight!) taken here that the emphasis is better placed on looking not at halting computations and their outputs, but by analysing what is the essential feature of these machines: that any computation stabilizes (we can regard a halting computation as a 'degenerate' case of stabilization). Let us make the following definition: Definition 4 Let S(α) = C i (α)|i ∈ N be the sequence of cell values at time α; let us call the snapshot of the computation P e (x) at time α to be the sequence S(α) together with any other appropriate specificatory information, such as the current position of the head, and the current line of the transition table.
As there are only continuum many possible snapshots of any given computation, we see that as α increases through the ordinals there must be some stage ξ so that a snapshot S(ξ) reappears at some later stage, and indeed the computation must at some stage enter an infinite repeating loop. Indeed for some computations of the form P e (x) although the machine has not formally halted, the contents y of the output tape remain unaltered from some point on ("the output tape has stabilized"). Such a real y is, in a very concrete sense, "eventually computable". Hamkins and Lewis's term for this was eventually writable.
Definition 5 [10, §3] (i) If there is some point in time δ so that for all later δ the content of the output tape of P e (0) is fixed with content y ∈ 2 N ("P e (0) ↑ y") we say that y is eventually writable. (ii) For the least such δ occurring in (i) (if it exists), we shall write P e (0) ↑ δ y. (iii) ζ = df sup{β | β has an eventually writable code}. (iy) H(ζ) is the class of sets A with eventually writable code.
Again, any ζ < ζ has eventually writable code, and H(ζ) is a transitive class of sets. We may then ask: Q4 What are ζ and H(ζ)?
An important point to note is that any computation that starts to cycle will in fact do so after a countable number of stages (a simple Löwenheim-Skolem argument shows this, or it can be done directly (see [10, Thm 1.1])). The ordinal ζ (and the set H(ζ)) are thus necessarily countable.
Lastly we define a third class of sets: those whose code appears on the output tape of some computation, although such appearance may be evanescent:
Definition 6 [10, §3] (i) A real y ∈ 2 N is accidentally writable if there is some e so that y appears on one of the computation tapes of P e (0) at some point in time.
(ii) Σ = df sup{β | β has an accidentally writable code}; (iii) H(Σ) is the class of sets with accidentally writable codes.
There is the obvious version of Q4 for Σ and for accidentally writable sets. In the papers [32] and [33] we answered the above questions Q1-Q4 (and Q5 below). The first paper [33] was primarily motivated with answering the "clockables = writables?" query, and missed out on the fundamental relationship (that we called the λ-ζ-Σ-Theorem), which was published in [32] . We take the opportunity here in the first part of the paper to give a cleaner account of these arguments and recast the above theorem. We shall also use this to give a machine-theoretic proof of a theorem of Friedman and Harrington.
Before doing this we give one definition that is begging to be made.
Definition 7 (i) x ⊆ N is said to be decidable iff there is some e ∈ N so that ∀n ∈ NP e (n) ↓ and ∀n(n ∈ x ↔ P e (n) ↓ 1).
(ii) A ⊆ 2 N is said to be decidable iff there is some e ∈ N so that ∀x ∈ 2 N P e (x) ↓ and ∀x ∈ 2 N (x ∈ A ↔ P e (x) ↓ 1).
We then may ask:
Q5 What are the ITTM decidable sets of integers, or reals?
Relationships to other work
In the immediate ITTM neighbourhood, we have indicated the pioneering paper of Hamkins and Lewis [10] where all the basic architecture, definitions, and results are stated. The same authors pursue the Turing machine analogy in [11] where they investigate Post's problem for both integer and real computation using ITTM's. Hamkins and Seabold looked at the single tape model in [12] as alluded to, and for most purposes their results show that the 1 tape model is sufficient to replace the 3 tape model. It is one of our themes that proper comparison of ITTM degree and computational structure should not be that with ordinary standard Turing degrees, but with that obtained from generalized recursion theory or higher type recursion theory. We have pursued this analogy in [31] (the former appearing, by the vagaries of the publication processes even before [10]!) and [34] . It is our view that ITTM's provide a model of computation that is stronger than that of Kleene's Recursion (see [17] ). However the resulting degree structure is more akin to that of hyperdegrees or even ∆ 1 2 -degrees. (Hamkins and Lewis's negative result to Post's problem in ITTM theory, as opposed to Post's positive solution for standard Turing degrees, points in this direction, and the results on complete sets in degrees of the ITTM jump hierarchy being recursively isomorphic to codes of levels of the Gödel hierarchy in [32] confirm this.) In order to view ITTM's as providing a model of recursion however, one needs the λ-ζ-Σ-Theorem characterisation of the relevant ordinals, and then at that point one can obtain a "Normal Form Theorem" (Corollary 5). This then links ITTM theory qua a recursion theory with the generalised theory of Spector classes in Higher Type Recursion Theory. Further discussion of this would take us too far afield.
Whatever one's view on the connection with higher recursion theory, one does seem to need to analyse the theory at a more abstract level (meaning not at the level of machine programs) and see the connections with lower level set theory, mainly that of the constructible sets, and in particular with that of theory of admissible sets (see [1] ). Kripke and Platek formulated the theory KP which is a weakening of the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms of set theory so that, in brief, we have instances of ∆ 1 -Separation and Σ 1 -Replacement (meaning that the relevant schemes are restricted to apply to formulae in the mentioned classes). Models of KP are then called admissible sets.
As Kleene Recursion is tied up intimately with a higher type recursion at the level of such sets (see for example [16] ), so ITTM Recursion is tied up with models of an enhanced theory of KP (namely Σ 2 -KP obtained by enhancing the Replacement scheme to require Σ 2 -Replacement) which enjoy an extendability property (namely that between L ζ and L Σ ). Just as the higher type Kleene Recursion is at the level of admissible sets, so our contention is that ITTM computation on sets of reals, is at the level of "Σ 2 -extendable sets". However we have to make use of these sets even when analysing computation on sets of integers, i.e. at one type down.
This particular "liminf" inductive constructive has its parallels in other areas. (1) Löwe was the first to point out the similarities of the ITTM computation sequences with certain so-called revision sequences in the theory of truth of Herzberger. This was pursued in [22] , [21] , and [23] . In fact we now see that formally these structures are mutually interpretable: any computation can be coded into a revision sequence, so that the eventual output/tape values etc. , are recursive in the stability set of a Herzberger revision sequence. (2) Kreutzer [20] used essentially a revision rule akin to Herzberger's when defining a new partial fixed point semantics. (3) Burgess [2] abstracted from Herzbergerian revision semantics the notion of a (arithmetically) quasi-inductive definition. This is the mathematical analogue appropriate to procedures involving infinitary liminf rules, of (monotone) inductive definitions (and operators). Questions then relating to one area from ITTM's, revision sequences, and quasi-inductive definitions have their formal equivalents in either of the the other two. One question of foundational interest is: "How much of analysis is needed to show that ITTM computations halt or enter a loop?" One can formulate this as a statement of second order number theory, and it can be shown that this is provable in Π 1 3 -CA 0 but not Π 1 2 -CA 0 (see Simpson [29] for the relevant notions here). There are connections with ordinal analysis is proof theory. Rathjen ([26] ) has given an ordinal analysis of Π 1 2 -CA 0 which is tied up with analysing chains of Σ 1 extendible levels of the L-hierarchy. The presumed ordinal analysis of Π 1 3 -CA 0 will involve chains of Σ 2 extendibles in the L-hierarchy. Analysis of computability on integers here involves statements concerning the first link in such a chain (see Theorem 1 below).
Lastly there is the question of what these virtual machines are "good for". One aspect is that, as Hamkins and Lewis say in their introduction, is that the machines have a defined behaviours at limit stages: we do not have to agonize over any physically imposed constraints or configurations. We may then think of ITTM's as a mathematical laboratory for analysing other modes of infinitary or transfinite computational model making. For example, the purely physical models of Hogarth [13] , [14] , and Etesi-Németi [7] concerning possible levels of computation in various spacetimes can be simulated on ITTM's. Insights gained from the "conceptual" ITTM models can be used to feed back to those putative physical models. (It turns out that the Hogarth models can be considerably "amplified" see [30] . One should perhaps not make too much of this, since ITTM's are themselves subject to a particular infinitary rule at limit times, that might conceivably not be compatible with some yet-to-be-devised physical models. However in general the physical GR-models are in the case of EtesiNémeti, at the level of ∆ 0 2 or "trial and error predicates" and can be modelled just on an ITTM with just a single limit point in time; the Hogarth model of [14] decides arithmetical statements, and these can be done in ω 2 many steps on an ITTM and hence in an arrangement using just infinitely many limit pointsor as Hogarth does -an ω-sequence of standard Turing machines in a particular space-time arrangement that allows appropriate communication between the devices. The "amplification" referred to above, is to see that Hogarth's set-up can sustain hyperarithmetical queries, and thus can be simulated on an ITTM working through the recursive ordinals. One could go further, but the physical interpretation starts to stretch incredulity (if it has not done so already!). We do not investigate these matters further here.)
A detailed outline and a description of new results
Section 2 continues with some basic definitions and facts mostly taken from [10] . We then proceed to look at cell stabilization times Lemma 1. That the height of the ordinals ζ, Σ gives the first repeating snapshots in the universal machine program is established in Lemma 2. The main theorem characterising in terms of the notion of Σ 2 -extendability of levels of the L-hierarchy, is Theorem 1.
The statement connecting all of λ, ζ, Σ is at Corollary 2 of the main Theorem 1, and the "clockables are writable" question is answered at Corollary 3. (This hierarchy is so well studied that one could not expect that there be new set theoretical results, but new proofs or insights could perhaps be obtained). In Section 2 we give what could perhaps be called a purely "machine-theoretic" proof of a theorem of his and Harrington, where they in turn answered a question of Richter. Richter's question was whether the first two levels of the L hierarchy with the same Σ 2 -theories (meaning the same set Σ 2 -sentences in the language of set the-ory were true at both levels) was also the first pair with this Σ 2 -extendability property. Friedman and Harrington answered affirmatively, and although one might automatically expect that the answer be positive, it required some argument. Friedman's original proof involved finestructural considerations and utilised an argument showing that in this region of the L-hierarchy one has uniform Σ 2 -skolem functions (see [8] ). For us the argument drops out of the fact that between S(ζ) and S(Σ), the snapshots of the universal machine are those of a permanently looping cycle (in tandem with the fact that codes for levels of the L α -hierarchy are accidentally writable for levels α < Σ). This is at Lemma 8. We let the reader decide what new insight this gives, if any, on the FriedmanHarrington result.
In the second part of this paper (Sections 3 and 4) we consider a number of open questions. In Section 3 we answer:
Q6 If P e (0) ↓ α then how fast can one write down a code for α itself?
We show (Lemma 9) that if α is a halting time of a program, then in fact there is another program that halts in time ≤ α with a real code y ∈ WO on its output tape with ||y|| = α. This allows us to claim that in the Normal Form Theorem (Cor 5) we may always find a code for a course of a computation very close to the same time as the length of the original computation (uniformly on all inputs). A more precise form of this is stated at Theorem 7.
We characterise those ordinals that initiate gaps in the clockable ordinals. Hamkins and Lewis had shown that if α is admissible then no computation P e (n) halts in precisely α steps, and admissible α either start gaps in the halting times of such computations, or are already interior to one. The converse question arises:
Q7 If α starts a gap in the clockable ordinals, is it admissible?
We answer affirmatively at Theorem 8. In Section 4 we discuss some differences between the 'standard' 3 tape machine of [10] and a 1 tape machine of [12] . The class of computable functions f : 2 N −→ N is identical for both models, but there are slight differences if one wishes to consider functions f : 2 N −→ 2 N . As Hamkins and Seabold demonstrated, this arises just out of small technicality: a final stage of simulating a 3 tape computation of a function f : 2 N −→ 2 N on a 1 tape machine cannot halt without an additional piece of, either hardware (an extra reserved cell, or extra piece of information stored in the r/w head)) or changing the alphabet (a 3 symbol alphabet allows the storage of a bit more information). In discussing the 1 tape machine Hamkins and Seabold again looked at halting times of such machines; one expects some vagaries of difference here between the two models. They catalogued many halting times, but left open whether any halting time of a 3 tape machine which was a simple limit ordinal could be the halting time of a 1 tape machine. We give a counterexample to this suggestion, Theorem 9, by showing that if α is the least Π 3 -reflecting ordinal then α + ω is the halting time of a 3 tape machine but not of a 1 tape version.
The basic λ-ζ-Σ relation.
We start our investigation of this relationship by first listing some basic facts of the ITTM concept. 2.1-2.4 are due to Hamkins and Lewis and are in [10] :
1 predicate of reals is decidable by some P e : meaning that if
Hence it is possible, given a standard method for coding hereditarily countable sets, for a machine to verify if y ∈ 2 N is such a code.
It is an exercise in dovetailing (see [35] and the argument at (1) of Theorem 9 below) to see that there is an algorithm so that if B ∈ 2 N is written on the input tape (equivalently the scratch tape) portion then after ω many steps the characteristic function of the complete Σ B 2 set is written on the output tape (meaning that k ∈ B iff the k'th cell on the output tape contains a 1). This operation B −→ B is characteristic of such machines. There is a universal machine U which we often consider as running simultaneously all the computations P e (0) for e ∈ ω. We organise this of course by dividing up the scratch and output tapes of U recursively into infinitely many other virtual 'tapes'.
Definition 8 (cf. [10] proof of 8.6.) We let σ(ν) denote the "grand sum" function that adds together all the ordinals that are coded on U 's 'tapes' at time ν.
We may thus think of σ(ν) as a temporary 'approximation' to Σ, but not in any sense that it is monotonically increasing to that limit: once ν > ζ then σ(ν) remains in the interval (ζ, Σ) in an oscillatory fashion. It is easy to see also that (by the same reasons for 2.2):
Although it turns out not to be admissible ( [33, Cor 3.4] ). In [10] it is shown that if one has a real y ∈ WO which is code for the ordinal α on a tape then it is easy to arrange a computation that computes, by iterating the definition of the constructible L γ -hierarchy along the ordering coded by y, a code for L α . (This is also done in detail in [9] .) This construction proceeds formally by an induction along y and can be done inside any sufficiently closed set containing the real y. Very weak closure conditions are needed for this. Closure under the rudimentary functions (see [4] ) suffices here. As Fact 2.2 asserts that H(λ) and H(ζ) are unions of admissible sets (and are 'sufficiently closed' in the above sense), it is then straightforward to see that:
We may thus view the above as saying that the machines as also capable of producing codes for initial segments of the L-hierarchy, at least up to ζ.
However an easy argument shows that:
Proof: We give the argument in this case as we shall build on it in the sequel. We may consider variations on a universal machine U that pause automatically at fixed intervals of time and given any accidentally writable y ∈ 2 N appearing on some 'tape' of U at such a stage, it initiates simulations of the standard turing machines to compute the ranks {e} y for those e ∈ ω, so that {e} y ∈ WO. (It is unproblematic for a machine to check the Π 1 1 -question as to whether {e} y ∈ WO by Hamkins and Lewis' result [10, 2.3] mentioned at Fact 2.1 above). Hence if y ∈ H(Σ) then so are all the ordinals of the form {e} y , and then so all sets of the form L ||e|| y [y], from which (i) follows.
Q.E.D.
However it is readily seen that the ITTM construction and processes are highly absolute. Thus any computation P e (0) for example can be performed inside any rudimentary closed set M, and the computation sequence is seen to be absolute for as many stages as there are ordinals in M. We thus have:
and thus with Facts 2.4, 2.5 above we have equality as well.
However at this stage we have not identified these ordinals in any way, nor have we any hold as to what the ITTM-decidable sets of integers may be.
It is a small but important point to note that one may have identical snapshots at different points in time ν < ν (or even at points ν n < ν n+1 for n < ω) without the computation being in a final infinite loop (perhaps C i (ν n ) = 1 = C i (ν n+1 ), but for some ν n < ξ n < ν n+1 we may have C i (ξ n ) = 0; if ν = sup n {ν n } we shall have C i ( ν) = 0). To get a permanently repeating loop in the snapshot sequence one needs to know the above scenario is not occurring: one needs to know that there are no such ξ n times as in the example given: then we know there are no switches in value and any limit point snapshot of an apparent looping sequence really is a final, repeating loop. Such snapshots then reappear on a closed and unbounded class of ordinal stages.
We now prove a lemma on the stabilization points of cells C i during a computation P e (0). We make the following definition:
Lemma 1 Let P e (0) be any program, and let the cell values be C i (ν) at time ν. Then C i (Σ) = C i (ζ) for any i < ω. In particular: Either δ i (ζ), δ i (Σ) are both defined and equal, or they are both undefined.
Proof: We let P f (0) be the program that (i) computes 'grand sum' ordinals σ(ν) as above; (ii) calculates δ i (σ(ν)), by simulating a run of P e (0) and looking at cell values in that run.
(iii) it then writes the value of δ i (σ(ν)) (if it is defined) to a reserved area of tape, R 1 , but only after inspecting the current contents of R 1 , and if that contents codes an ordinal δ 1 say, it checks that δ 1 < δ i (σ(ν)). Thus, if δ 1 is not a smaller ordinal than δ i (σ(ν)), for whatever reason, then δ 1 is left on R 1 , unchanged. Otherwise the code to hand for δ i (σ(ν)) replaces that for δ 1 
) will be present on the segment R 1 at the end of this stage, never to be overwitten. Thus ν 0 is eventually writable, and so ν 0 < ζ. We deduce that δ i (Σ) ≤ ν 0 < ζ. However it is now obvious that δ i (ζ) is defined and must equal δ i (Σ). Now suppose that δ i (ζ) is defined. Let P g be any program that eventually has a code for the eventually writable ordinal δ i (ζ) on its output tape. Suppose at time σ(ν) P g has on its output tape a code for δ ν . Let P f be the following modification of the above program P f : a further task (iv) is added: on calculating δ i (σ(ν)) if it sees it must write this as a new ordinal code to R 1 , it additionally writes to R 2 , say, a code for the least ξ ∈ (δ ν , δ i (σ(ν)) where C i changed value (if such exists); otherwise it does nothing. Now at stage (iv), if we suppose σ(ν) sufficiently large so that a code for the eventual value δ i (ζ) is present on P g for all times later than ν, and then an ordinal code is written on R 2 , it would stay permanently there: it is thus eventually writable. However that contradicts the definition of δ i (ζ)! Hence C i cannot change value throughout the interval (δ i (ζ), Σ).
Finally note that if one (equivalently both) of δ i (ζ), δ i (Σ) is undefined, then C i (ζ) = C i (Σ) = 0 by the liminf rule on cell values.
If we let P e be the program of the universal machine U we see that U thus has repeating snapshot sequences S U (ν) for ν = ζ and Σ. The above argument (for U now rather than P e ) shows that no cell stabilized at ζ changes value for the universal machine in (ζ, Σ). Further, the cells stabilized at Σ are then precisely those stabilized at ζ: all other cells then have value 0 at both these times by the liminf rule.
We thus have shown the first part of (i) of the next Lemma. The second part of (i) (which we have also just established) merely emphasises this point: we do have a permanently repeating loop: the "snapshot sequence" S U (τ)|ζ ≤ τ < Σ is destined to repeat exactly with S U Σ.µ+τ = S U ζ+τ for any τ < Σ. It thus has periodicity Σ − ζ = Σ.
(ii) Moreover (ζ, Σ) is the lexicographically least pair of ordinals satisfying (i).
Proof:
We are only left with observing (ii). If (z, s) were a lexicographically lesser pair, we could write a program that, simulating U , searches for such a pair, and may then eventually write them (indeed may halt after finding them!) Thus both z, s < ζ. But then we have that the universal machine U has started looping before time ζ, but this is absurd as then we should have that the eventually writable ordinals all have codes in the smaller L z -and this cannot happen as L ζ is a union of admissible sets, Q.E.D.
In the sequel we shall only refer to snapshot sequences for the universal machine U so for brevity we shall drop the superscript on S U (ζ) etc.
0 is thus a jump operator, which codes indices of all programs of eventually stable output (we include all halted programs as also being of stable output). For the universal machine U by inspecting the 'tapes' of the programs P e (0) we can consider it calculating, we may 'read off' by inspecting certain cell values in S(ζ) which indices are in 0 and we have that 0 is thus (1-1) reducible to S(ζ). The converse is also true: given any cell C i whose value we are interested in during the computation of the universal machine U , we may write two programs P e(i) , P e(i) to flash its 0 value to the output tape of P e(i) when it changes ( or to P e(i) when the value becomes 1). We can thus read that value eventual value (if it exists) off from 0. We can then conclude that 0 and S(ν) are recursively isomorphic. We thus shall have:
Lemma 4 [33, Cor.3.1] Suppose ∃yP e (0) ↑ y. Then the least δ so that ∀δ > δ(y is on the output tape of P e (0)) is less than ζ.
Proof: This is really a corollary to (the argument of) Lemma 1: one writes a code for the least δ = δ(σ(ν)) so that the whole of a simulated run of P e (0) along σ(ν) in the interval [δ, σ(ν)) has constant output tape. The argument concludes that such a δ is eventually writable, thus is less than ζ.
Lemma 5 If y is eventually writable then y ≤ T S(ζ).
Proof: The last lemma shows that y is on a recursive slice of the universal machine's output tape which is devoted to simulating the computation of P e (0), Proof: Note that we have seen that H(Σ) = L Σ (Fact 2.6). Let
It is easy to see that E is recursive in S(ζ): we let the universal machine itself be simulated by some program P k writing down cell values from that simulation on a recursive slice of its scratch tape. Those that settle down provide us with a (recursive copy of) E, and this we can read off, again recursively, from S(ζ).
For
If L Σ were admissible, a simple closure argument would provide a τ < Σ which is a common limit point of each of the F i . This goes as follows. We may define by a Σ 1 -recursion the function g defined by
That g is Σ 1 definable over L Σ from ζ is easily checked, and moreover is defined on all of N. If L Σ were admissible its range would be bounded in Σ. If τ = sup(ran(g)) this would mean S(τ) = S(ζ) contradicting the minimality of Σ in Lemma 2(ii).
is of the form P e (S(ζ)) ↑ u for some e ∈ ω.
Proof: Suppose a code for u appears on P f (0) at time β. Suppose β < g(n) (where g(n) is taken from the last lemma). Note that g(n) is Σ 1 (H(Σ)) from the snapshot S(ζ). Given S(ζ) then by computing grand sums below Σ as usual we may search along σ(ν) < Σ running a program P e(n) (S(ζ)) to search for a code for the g(n). Suppose this code is y ∈ WO. If now b is the integer in the field of y coding that part of the ordering of order type β, we may then find a code for u by looking at the universal course of computation for P f (0) at the y b ∼ = β'th ordinal place. The overall computation may then halt with this code.
Remark Note that there will be many snapshots S(ζ ) from which a given u can be computed. Indeed for any u ∈ L ζ it can be shown that the least ζ for which this can be done is less than ζ. We now prove the principal theorem of this section. It relates the pair of ordinal suprema of two of the kinds of ordinal the ITTM universal machine can produce: the eventually writable which have supremum ζ and the accidentally writable which have supremum Σ. The theorem appeared first in [32] , but we give a clean presentation here, which we can use for a machine-theoretic proof of the Friedman-Harrington theorem (Theorem 2) to follow. The import of Theorem 1 (and why we are taking the trouble to reprove it here) is that it is the clear that all the corollaries, and most of the answers to the questions raised earlier can now be seen to follow from it. Previously the questions were answered in a somewhat more piecemeal fashion over several papers. We now can see that, for example, that the "Clockables are writables" Theorem (that γ = λ) from [33] , is actually a corollary to it. Moreover the Normal Form Theorem again becomes a corollary to it. We thus unify the results under one umbrella. The theorem is an equivalence between two notions defined in completely different ways: ordinals appearing on the "tapes" of a computational model involving transfinitely many stages in time, on the one hand, and on the other, the first pair of ordinals appearing at an appropriate level of definability of Gödel's hierarchy of constructible sets, with which he proved the consistency of the Axiom of Choice and the Continuum Hypothesis.
We could have put this and the next Theorem 2 together and have a three way equivalence, but choose not to cloud the main event. Theorem 2 is the first example whereby a result proper to set theory is proven (admittedly not for the first time) by appeal to an (admittedly infinitary) model of computation.
The pair (ζ, Σ) as defined above from ITTM's, is also the lexicographically least pair satisfying either of the following conditions:
(i) (ζ, Σ) is a pair of 'final repeat ordinals' where (a) the snapshot S(ζ) at time ζ of the universal machine U equals S(Σ), the snapshot at time Σ, and (b) S(ζ) then reappears for ever with periodicity Σ;
Proof: That (ζ, Σ) satisfy (i) has been shown at Lemma 2. We first show that (ζ, Σ) satisfy (ii). Suppose
where ψ is Σ 0 , and as an eventually writable parameter sequence we take the
For e a program index, write "P e (0) ≤τ u" to abbreviate " u appears on P e (0)'s computation tape at some time before or at time τ". Make also the obvious definition replacing "≤ τ" with "< τ". Let e 0 be a program index so that P e 0 (0) <Σ u 0 . Let e 1 be an index which "eventually writes" a code for ξ. The following Claim proves (ii).
Proof of Claim 1 By Corollary 1 there exists e so that P e (S(ζ)) ↓ u 0 . Thus (4) L Σ ∃u(P e (S(ζ)) ↓ u ∧ ∀vψ(u, v, ξ)).
[Proof of (5): let ζ , g be as in the antecedent. We may find a program P h that (i): using grand sum ordinals σ(ν) eventually writes down a code for the snapshot S(ζ ) and (ii): letting at time ν the approximation to S(ζ ) currently available be S(ζ ) ν , it writes down, if possible, a halting time α ν ≤ σ(ν) for a simulation P g (S(ζ ) ν ) along σ(ν). This will be possible, if the latter converges before σ(ν). In this manner, if P g (S(ζ ) ν ) ↓ α , then we see that α ν is eventually α, and α is thus less than ζ.] Thus if ζ < ζ is assumed to satisfy (4) and P e (S(ζ )) ↓ u 1 then we shall have u 1 ∈ L ζ and L Σ ∀ψ(u 1 , v, ξ)) and then by Π 1 reflection, that L ζ ∀ψ(u 1 , v, ξ)) and we'd have:
We should then be finished with Claim 1.
We thus only need to show that there is such a ζ < ζ satisfying (4). So we devise along by now familiar ways, a computation that eventually writes the least such ζ satisfying (4), thus ensuring it is less than ζ.
Let P k (0) be the program that: (i) incorporates a program P f (0) which eventually computes on its output tape a code for ξ; we set ξ ν for the value on this incorporated output tape at time ν; (ii) computes grand sum ordinals σ(ν) and searches L σ(ν) for the least ζ such that
and writes a code for such a ζ (if it exists) to a reserved area R 1 of the output tape; again it only does this latter step after first checking that the new ζ is greater than the current ordinal coded into R 1 . We know (by Lemma 4) that once σ(ν) is sufficiently large below ζ then ξ ν = ξ holds; we also know that once it is sufficiently large, above some ordinal τ say, which satisfies P e (S(ζ)) ↓ <τ u 0 , that it certainly can write down an ordinal ζ ≤ ζ, so the process is not vacuous. We claim the only ordinals written in this process to R 1 are less than ζ.
However once σ(ν) is above τ, then this ζ would remain there -it would not be the case at any later stage µ > ν with σ(µ) > σ(ν), that for any lesser ζ < ζ , we should then find u such that P e (S(ζ )) ↓ u with u fulfilling the requirement (7) (because by (5) P e (S(ζ ) ↓−→ P e (S(ζ )) ↓ <ζ , and thus L σ(ν) P e (S(ζ ))↓ <ζ u already). Likewise no snapshot S(ζ ) for ζ > ζ is necessary to find our u 0 . However that makes ζ eventually writable. Hence ζ < ζ.
Q.E.D. Claim 1
We have thus shown:
Proof: Suppose for a contradiction that (z,
However note by consideration of the universal machine U running inside L s , that L z ≺ Σ 2 L s alone implies that firstly that S(z) = S(s), and secondly that U is actually entering a final loop at time z -which will repeat at time s, again as part of a permanent cycle and thus both constraints (a) and (b) of (i) would also be satisfied. We show this more formally, letting
The point of the subclaim is that although we have S(z) = S(s) we have to again justify that the U has really finally entered a looping cycle and no cell which has value 1 at time z will at some later time have value 0, in other words that constraint (b) of (i) holds. Having established that, we have from Lemma 2(ii) that (z, s) must be (ζ, Σ).
Q.E.D. Claim 3 and Theorem
We shall add another characterisation to the pair (ζ, Σ) when we give a machine-theoretic proof Theorem 6 below. We now can note:
-admissible (and is a limit of such), and (b) H(Σ) = L Σ is a union of admissibles (in fact Σ 2 -admissibles).
Proof: (a) is proven by standard methods: Σ 2 -admissibility requires closure under ∆ 2 Comprehension and Σ 2 replacement schemes, and the Σ 2 extendability of L ζ gives us (more than) this. (b) is a simple application of Σ 2 -extendability of L ζ .
Remark 1 It can be shown that (ζ, Σ) is the lexicographically least pair such that for the universal machine U , S(ζ) = S(Σ), using the "Theory Machine" of [9] . There a very explicit calculation is made as to the points of occurrence of codes of L α levels and their Σ 2 -truth sets, for α < Σ.
We mention some further results that can be obtained from the above. By an addition to Theorem 1 we obtain:
Proof: The new part here is the Σ 1 -elementarity of H(λ) = L λ in H(ζ). But if L ζ ∃uϕ(u, ξ) where ξ < λ, then we run an algorithm that halts after it finds at some point an α with ξ < α < ζ for which there is such a u ∈ L α and then halts with an output code for L α . Hence L α ∈ L λ and thus L λ ∃uϕ(u, ξ). Q.E.D.
Corollary 3 ("All clockables are writables") γ = df sup{α | ∃e ∈ ωP e (0) halts in exactly α steps } = λ. That is, the writable ordinals are unbounded in the "clockable" ordinals of [10] Sect.3.
Proof:
If P e (0) halts in time α then this is a Σ 1 -statement true in L Σ . By the last corollary it is true in L λ . Hence γ ≤ λ. However γ is easily seen to be no less than λ, since if (a code for) λ < λ is the output of P f (0) , then we may follow P f (0) by the algorithm that checks through the code for λ for wellfoundedness; this takes at least λ steps before halting. Hence there is a clockable ordinal ≥ λ . Q.E.D.
Corollary 4
The ITTM decidable sets of integers x ⊆ N are precisely those sets
Proof: If x ⊆ N is ITTM decidable, using some procedure P e then the queries ?P e (n) ↓ 1? will all be decided by a computation of the universal machine U by time ζ. The statement "∃y(y codes a halting course of computation witnessing P e (n) ↓ 1)" is a Σ 1 statement in the language of set theory, and by the
we may set an ITTM machine running to produce a code for the set A = L α where α is least with x ∈ L α . We may then adjust this machine's program to output all of x and a fortiori x is seen to be decidable.
The following is an analogue of Kleene's Normal Theorem involving the T-predicate which, in the (standard) Turing case, gives integer codes for halting computations sequences. This classical theorem due to Kleene gives integer codes y (using prime power coding or some such) for a course of computation P e (n) as "inputs" to a universal T predicate T 1 (e, n, y). (Here the output of P e (n) would be coded into the last element of the sequence that is coded by y.) For us we have similarly a universal predicate, indeed we have the universal machine alluded to above, and this machine may simulate all P e (n) for all e and n at once. We have to have a real now to code the whole course of computation that is naturally transfinite in general. This real y codes snapshots of each stage of the computation. Without knowing that every halting computation halts before λ one would not be in a position to know that we could find for each e an index of a program that yields as halting outputs a code of the whole computation sequence -essentially a sequence of snapshots S(τ) for τ less than the length of the computation ϕ e (n).
We thus need to have for each length of a halting computation a writable real of that length along which we encode these snapshots. That is what the last Corollary provides.
The effectivity in the Normal Form Theorem of the transition e −→ e is obtained merely by observing that if we are interested in program P e then the following algorithm P e works. "Watch the universal machine's simulation of all programs P f . Given n some program P f (n) will halt with output some real y coding a wellorder of length longer than it takes for P e (n) to halt; now build a code for the course of computation P e (n) ↓ utilising the ordering y to form y. When this code y is complete with a final stage snapshot of the halting position of P e (n), then halt."
The algorithm sketched in quotation marks is then capable of being put into ITTM terms and is thus our P e . Although we have not given a complete numerical blow-by-blow description of the algorithm, it should be enough to see that we have something in close analogy to Kleene's T 1 . If e is the e'th standard Turing computable function, Kleene shows us that {e}(n) ↓↔ ∃y ∈ N T 1 (e, n, y). In the ITTM setting we see this is also essentially obtained by considering "universal" processes or machines, just as we are doing here. The universal machine U provides a "universal ITTM T predicate", T 1 say, so that we have P e (n) ↓↔ ∃y ∈ 2 N T 1 (e, n, y). The above does not show the fact we establish below in the next Section at Cor. 7 that we can provide tight bounds on the times needed to produce a code y. However the above reasoning establishes the following.
Corollary 5 (Normal form theorem I) For any ITTM computable function ϕ e we can effectively find another ITTM computable function ϕ e so that on any input n from ω if ϕ e (n) ↓ then ϕ e (n) ↓ y ∈ 2 N , where y codes a wellordered computation sequence for ϕ e (n).
If the reader lets us informally define (without going into all the details) Last(y) = z iff y codes a halting course of computation with the last output tape containing z ∈ 2 N , we may summarise the above discussion.
Corollary 6 (Normal form theorem I contd.) There is an ITTM decidable predicate T 1 so that ∀e∀n:
There is a higher type version obtained by relativising all the results (now for λ x , ζ x etc.) above to real number inputs:
Corollary 7 (Normal form theorem II) (a) For any ITTM computable function ϕ e we can effectively find another ITTM computable function ϕ e so that on any input x from 2 N if ϕ e (x) ↓ then ϕ e (x) ↓ y ∈ 2 N , where y codes a wellordered computation sequence for ϕ e (x). (b) The universal predicate T 1 satisfies ∀e∀x:
The effectivity is again established in the same way, noting that the input (whether n ∈ N or x ∈ 2 N ) does not affect the above description of an algorithm in any dynamic way.
Although this is not necessary for what follows, we may relate some of the above to the Σ 2 -mastercode of L ζ this is a constructible theoretic notion (see [4] ) and essentially is a set coding the whole of the structure L ζ , however in this arena it essentially can be taken to be the set T 2 ζ , the Σ 2 -truth set. We define these theories in generality as follows.
Then T 2 ζ is recursively isomorphic to those ITTM indices that index halting or eventually stable computations on zero input -this is the set 0 defined above.
(The reader to whom the notion of mastercode is unfamiliar, may simply drop the "A" from the following.)
ζ . There are also intimate connections between the jump operator derived from the halting problem for ITTM's. Hamkins and Lewis define:
In particular 0 is recursively isomorphic to the Σ 1 -theory of L λ .
(ii)[32, Thm 1.5] The assignment x λ x satisfies Spector's Criterion:
where x ≤ ∞ y ⇐⇒ ∃e ∈ N(P e (y) ↓ x).
One could compare the above with the analogous result that Kleene's O is recursively isomorphic to the Σ 1 -truth set of L ω ck 1 (the latter is the level of the Gödel constructible hierarchy indexed by the least non-recursive ordinal). Given that the relation x ≤ ∞ y defined in the last theorem is ∆ 1 2 one sees that we have here a degree notion on sets of integers that is intermediate between hyperarithmetic, or ∆ 1 1 and ∆ 1 2 . A completely precise characterization awaits. The notion of ≤ ∞ reducibility is a very natural one, when thinking of a machine model. However the nature of the machines is determined by the limit rule specification: and that is a Σ 2 -notion (cell C i 's values are 0 at a limit stage unless ∃ν∀ν > ν(C i (ν ) = 1).) The ultimate behaviour of such machines is tied in, as we have seen, with the looping behaviour of the universal machine U and the ordinals ζ, Σ; and here the Σ 2 nature of the machinery is apparent. We may thus define a notion of relative computability not by when a machine halts with some t on its output tape, but by what it eventually has on its output tape (if anything). There is thus a central notion of x is eventually computable in y:
Definition 12 [32, 2.10]) (i) We set x ≤ ∞ y iff for some index e we have P e (y) ↑ x.
In other words: x ≤ ∞ y ⇐⇒ df ∃e ∈ N(P e (y) ↑ x);
(ii)([32, 2.11]) we define the concomitant notion of jump by:
There is an argument to be made that this reducibility, and notion of relative computability should be the fundamental notion of ITTM computability. We have seen that we can obtain the results on clockable ordinals, and on what are the decidable sets of integers etc, only after settling all the Σ 2 questions concerning repeating snapshots etc. Further note that the universal machine U on 0 input is constructing the whole of the L hierarchy permanently up to ζ (and somewhat more ephemerally, up to L Σ ). There are natural Spector classes (see [24, 4C] ) associated with this notion of computation and [10, 7.3] demonstrates the existence of that associated with the notion of semi-decidable; similar arguments show that the much larger Spector Class is intimately associated with "eventually semi-decidable" sets of reals, and is available from the ITTM architecture.
These concepts are discussed further in [35] . As the ordinary degree structure ≤ ∞ turns out not to be much like Turing degrees, but more like hyperdegrees, there is less psychological need to stick with halting computations, as with stable computations -and then we regard 'halting' as a particularly stable kind of stability! If we make this decision then ITTM definable sets can then be related to the notion of arithmetically quasi-inductive ([2]) which we have mentioned in the introduction. Again the relation x ≤ ∞ y is ∆ 1 2 . We then have:
The assignment x ζ x satisfies Spector's Criterion:
Along these lines, A. Klev has defined in [19] an extension of Kleene's O to an O ++ , that mirrors exactly Kleene's original definition as a tree (indeed the tree is literally an extension of Kleene's), and is to the complete
The relevant definition and the L-hierarchy equivalent formulation at the higher type run as follows:
Definition 13 Let A, B ⊆ 2 N . Then A ≤ ∞ B iff there is some program index e ∈ ω, and some y ∈ 2 N , so that for any x ∈ 2 N we have:
Theorem 5 Let A, B ⊆ 2 N . Then A ≤ ∞ B iff for some pair of Σ 2 formulae ϕ 0 , ϕ 1 ∈ L∈ ,ẋ,ẏḂ , for some y ∈ 2 N , we have for any x ∈ 2 N :
where we set ζ x,y,B to be least ζ so that there is some least
W. Richter asked (communication with Friedman and Harrington) whether, for any 2 ≤ n, the lexicographically least pair of ordinals (ζ n , Σ n ) with T n ζ n = T n Σ n was the lexicographically least pair satisfying: L z ≺ Σ n L s . This was positively answered, independently by L. Harrington and by S-D. Friedman.
Theorem 6 (Friedman [8] , Harrington (unpublished)) Let n ≥ 2. If (z, s) is the lexicographically least pair satisfying T n z = T n s then L z ≺ Σ n L s . For n = 2 this question arises naturally in ITTM theory, and adds another characterisation to Theorem 1.
Proof: We use the notation of Theorem 1. For a contradiction suppose that
Again we see that S(z) = S(s) as these snapshots are coded into the Σ 2 -theories. Just as in Claim 3 (of Theorem 1) these cannot be snapshots of the final looping sequence of U . So for some i and D defined as in the Subclaim of this Claim 3 there, δ = df sup(D) < s and
and k is such that f (k) = z. But the Σ 2 -theory of L s does not have a Π 2 , and a Σ 2 , parameter free definition over L s which the above provides. So this is a contradiction. As T 2 Σ clearly equals T 2 ζ , we obtain the desired result.
Q.E.D.
Having thus set out the basic fundamentals of the theory we turn to two sets of problems which are left unanswered by the above.
Halting and Writing Times
In this section we address two issues: once a machine computing, say P e (0), has stopped, how quickly could we produce a code for that course of computation? If for example the machine halts after α steps, the Normal Form Theorem tells us that there is a y, a code for that course of computation, but gives no information as to where/when/how to find it. In order to produce such a y, one must first start out by producing a code for α itself. Once that is done, one can run another computation that takes the given code for α and simulates along the ordering coded the original course of computation of P e (0) ↓. For a machine to build a course of computation it must have the materials consisting of an ordering along which to work (and the original instructions embodied in P e of course).
The first theorem below says that in fact we can compute a code for α extremely fast: in fact there is another program that will do it in α + ω steps at worst.
The second issue is whether the gaps in the clockable ordinals noted by Hamkins and Lewis ([10, Gap Existence Theorem 3.4]) are all initiated at stages in time which correspond to admissible ordinals. (They had noted that admissible ordinals can start gaps, since they had shown that no admissible ordinal can be the precise length of any halting computation.) We show here that gaps must be started by admissible ordinals.
Quick Writing
We prove here a result which we have announced, and has been used in the literature, (see [3] ), but whose proof has not yet appeared. It concerns quick writing: if a program halts after α many steps, how soon can a machine produce a code for α? That it can produce a code is the ''Clockables are Writables" theorem (Cor. 3). But how quickly? We previously had announced a slightly weaker result that required α + ω many steps to write α. We observe here that it can be done in ≤ α steps.
Lemma 9
Suppose e is such that P e (0) ↓ in exactly α ≥ ω steps. Then there is f such that P f (0) ↓ y in ≤ α steps with y ∈ WO ∧ y = α.
Proof: If P e (0) ↓ in exactly α steps then α is inadmissible (by [10, Thm 8.8] ). Set γ = df the largest admissible, or limit of admissibles, ≤ α. We split into cases: although these could all be absorbed into Case 3, the other arguments are not unilluminating. Case 1 γ = α. Then α is a limit of admissibles. The program P e (0) is halting at the limit time α because it is viewing a particular configurations of 0, 1's in the three cells C 0 (α), C 1 (α), C 2 (α) (recall that the read/write head views three cells on each of the tapes at the same time; at time α it is in the limit state q L and due to a line on its transition table, immediately goes next into a halting state because of the configuration it sees. Let the triplet C 0 (α),
Then not all of the k j are 1: if so there would be some previous limit stage α < α at which the r/w head would be viewing precisely this configuration and it would have halted earlier. So at least one of the k j is a 0. We could now divide into subcases as to which particular combinations of these three cells contains 0's; but let us just pretend it is the cell C 0 (α) that has value 0 at this limit stage, and it is this appearance of a 0 at this limit point in time alone that causes the machine to halt. It therefore cannot be that C 0 contained a 0 at any previous limit time: we conclude that there is only a 0 at time α because there has been a strictly increasing sequence of stages β n + 1 for n < ω with C 0 (β n + 1) = 0 = C 0 (β n + 2). Perforce sup{β n + 1|n < ω} = α, (otherwise, again, there would have been an earlier halt). We now run the universal machine U , and look for grand sums of ordinals σ(ν) for ν < α along the way. By admissibility, ν < α −→ σ(ν) < α (as we can think of running the machines inside L α ). We devise a modification to this program that (i) simulates the original P e (0), and (ii) that for the first time it sees an ordinal γ 0 + 1 with (a) C 0 (γ 0 + 1) = 0 = C 0 (γ 0 + 2) and (b) C 1 (γ 0 + 1) = 1 = C 2 (γ 0 + 1) it writes a code for γ 0 to a reserved area of tape R again. At a later time when a larger γ 1 is found satisfying (a) and (b), it first checks: (c) that the values C 1 (γ ), C 2 (γ ) have been constantly 1 in the interval [C 1 (γ 0 + 1, γ 1 + 1) (if this fails she must scrap the contents of R setting it to 0's), she then "adds" the codes for the wellordering γ 1 to the ordinal code in R (this takes at most ω steps) to obtain (if in this case (c) did not fail), γ 0 + γ 1 . We can organise these additions in a continuous way (as we know that we shall have exactly order type ω many successful lengthenings of these wellorderings), so that continuing in this fashion at stage α it will have a code for the unbounded sum of the ordinals β n in the area R; this will take as many steps as the calculation of P e (0), namely α. When the simulated P e (0) halts, so does this program. A code for α in this case is then computable in precisely α steps.
Case 2. γ < α < γ + ω.
Hamkins and Lewis (in the 'Speed-Up Lemma') [10, Lemma 3.3] show in general that if δ + n is clockable then so is δ. Hence there is e so that P e (0) halts in exactly γ steps. It suffices to write a code for γ in the manner of Case 1, with k further points added on the end, where α = γ + k for some k < ω. This can be done (providing we write the k many extra points first!), as we have seen, in γ many steps.
We consider the following algorithm P h for computing truth sets of structures L δ , ∈ . P h effects the following:
(ii) Looks on U 's "tape" for codes of wellfounded models of the form L β , for increasing β:
(iii) When it finds an L β it writes T 2 β , the Σ 2 -truth set for L β to a reserved part R 1 , of its scratch tape; it does this by writing a 0 in cell C i if the gödel number of the i'th Σ 2 sentence is in T 2 β , and 1 otherwise. (iv) when (iii) is done, we require it to flash a Flag cell "1, 0, 1"; then it goes back to (ii) to look for a larger L β to repeat the process, and overwrite T 2 β with its new values T 2 β .
Each time it cycles through (ii) -(iv) the flag is flashed. The result being that at some limit stage with the flag at '0', we know we have some T β * on the scratch tape, for β * = sup n β n where all T 2 β n have previously appeared on the scratch tape. Note that this "eventual theory" T β * ⊇ T 2 β * , but in general will not be equal. (We are obliged to Sy Friedman for pointing out that we had not taken care of this in our previous proof.) Some Σ 2 sentence may be true for arbitrarily large γ < γ without being true at γ.
Here we appeal instead to Lemma 1 of [9] : which shows that the Σ 2 theory of L β * , T 2 β * , is then uniformly (in β * ) recursively enumerable in this 'eventual theory' T β * . From T 2 β * we can define recursively a real coding a wellorder of length β * . This gives us a new, larger, ordinal to work on, and the algorithm at (iv), when it returns to (ii) can continue. In short we have a procedure which over any admissible L δ is a Σ 1 -definable: if on the η'th time we loop around this process the theory T 2 η * is obtained, then η → η * is an increasing function Σ 1 definable over any admissible L δ where it will define a function δ → δ. Moreover at time δ it will have T δ on R 1 .
As γ is a limit of admissibles, then at stage γ this process has written T γ to R 1 . We now note that the next admissible ordinal γ + > γ is the least ordinal not recursive in T γ , i.e. γ + = ω
. As α ≥ γ + ω there is a subset, G of ω, recursive in T γ by some (standard) Turing reduction {g} T γ for some g ∈ ω with G coding a wellorder of type α. However now recall that if B is any set on the scratch tape at time δ, then at time δ + ω we may arrange for B to be written to the output tape. As G ≤ T T γ we may similarly arrange instead for G to be written by time γ + ω ≤ α. To complete the Lemma we need to observe that we can also get this algorithm to halt at exactly time α: this can be effected by running the original program P e (0) that halted in time α in parallel and simultaneously with the above. Since our "arrangement" described above will be writing many different "G" as {g} T δ for different δ ≤ γ we need to know when to stop. We thus run P e (0) as a clock to tell us.
From this kind of thinking we may obtain some information extra concerning possible normal form course of computations. The division into cases above can be overcome, if we allow ourselves some more steps to play with. We can then find a bound on the times needed to produce codes in the Normal Form Theorem Cor.5. We omit the details of the proof.
Theorem 7
If ϕ e is an ITTM computable function then we may effectively find an e ∈ ω satisfying the Normal Form Theorem so that for any n ∈ ω if ϕ e (n) ↓ in α steps (where α ≥ ω) then ϕ e (n) ↓ y in < ω 2 .(α + 2) steps Proof: We briefly sketch the argument which uses the "Theory Machine" of [9] . We use the J α Jensen hierarchy for the constructible sets (see [15] or [4] ). If P e (n) ↓ α then by absoluteness of the machine construction (P e (n) ↓ α ) J α+1 , and there is a course of computation code y witnessing this with y ∈ J α+1 . With care one can wrote this out as a parameter free definition of y which is Σ J α+1 2 . However the Theory Machine continually produces codes for levels of the Jhierarchy together with their theories, on its output tape (without ever halting), and it turns out that this machine will have a real c = c α+1 on its output tape at time ω 2 .(α + 1) + ω which codes the structure J α+1 . Recursively in c then (using the index e to define the reduction), we may define the code y. This takes another ω many steps, and we have a code for y written out in ω 2 .(α + 1) + ω + ω many steps.
There is a similar corollary for the Normal Form Theorem II, (Cor. 7), involving real number inputs x which is again uniform in x. We leave this to the reader to formulate.
Only admissibles start gaps
We now show that only admissible ordinals start gaps. Previously it was known that many gaps were started by admissible ordinals, and that no admissible was the length of any halting computation of the form P e (n) ↓. The short argument that follow shows that admissibility is required for this to happen. This was announced (but unproven) as Theorem 17 in [35] .
Theorem 8
If γ starts a gap in the clockable ordinals, then γ is admissible.
Proof: We suppose this fails, and that γ 0 starts a gap, but is inadmissible. By this supposition then:
for some Σ 1 ψ, some ordinal parameter ξ, where ψ is defining a function F : ω → γ 0 monotone cofinally. Note that γ 0 is a limit of clockable ordinals, (otherwise it could not be starting a gap in the clockables, but would be interior to one!) Hence ξ < ξ < γ 0 for some clockable ξ and by applying Lemma 9 as above, there is a program index f producing in ξ steps a code for ξ and by a trivial modification that writes down a suitable initial segment, an index f can be effectively found from f so that P f (0) τ ↓ y ξ ∈ WO ∧||y ξ || = ξ and τ ≤ ξ .
We consider the following algorithm P: it simulates P f until this has converged. We have, by using a universal machine, that there is a program index e 0 ∈ ω so that ϕ e 0 continually computes (without ever halting) a code on its scratch area for levels L σ of the L-hierarchy, where σ is the (current) grand sum of all ordinals coded on all halted output computations as simulated by the universal machine.
Once P f has converged, we run P e 0 at the same time checking within the L σ 's constructed whether L σ ∃αψ(n, α, ξ) for each n. It lists those n for which this holds to a piece of scratch tape, and flashes the lead cell C 0 1,0,1 each time a new n is added to the list (otherwise C 0 is untouched). P e finally halts if at any limit stage C 0 contains a 0. But it is easy to check that this happens exactly at γ 0 . Hence γ 0 does not start a gap. Contradiction!
Q.E.D.(Theorem 8)
This finishes our results on the "standard models" of ITTM's.
3 Tape and 1 Tape limit halting times
We consider now the 1 tape model of [12] . Here, the 3 tape model is replaced with a single tape, and a read/write head viewing just one single cell at a time.
In all other respects the machinery, software, behaviour at limit times etc., is identical to the 3 tape machine. It is shown that in [12] that the 1 tape machine is not exactly the same in its behaviour as the 3 tape machine: the classes of computable functions on integers, or even function f : 2 N −→ N are identical. However there is a difficulty of simulating 3 tape computations for functions f : 2 N −→ 2 N . One way around this difficulty is by allowing a 3-symbol alphabet. We outlined one method for this in [31] , where we allowed a 'B' for a blank symbol as well as 0, 1, and the B (for ambiguity) would be written at a limit stage λ in a cell that had changed value cofinally in λ. Such an arrangement is also fully powerful as regards the 3 tape model. In [35] we discussed further the relationship of the 1 tape model to the 3 tape model, principally in terms of classifying what is on the tapes at limit ordinal stages. One advantage of the 1 tape model is that one can get a definable pointclass of sets that is adequate (in the sense of Moschovakis [24] p.158). With a 3 tape model, and the R/W head reading 3 cells simultaneously at the start position, one obtains classes one step up in a difference hierarchy which are not adequate. (Adequacy is desirable as it allows for parametrization and some closure properties to be enjoyed). The paper [35] further classified descriptive set-theoretically pointclasses on 1 tape machines defined by halting times. A very nice suggestion coming from work on ordinal length tape Turing machines (from Dawson and Koepke) is that we do not place the R/W back on cell C 0 at a limit time λ, but on the liminf of the cell positions up to time λ, and moreover the machine state q i at time λ is the liminf of the machine states up to this time also. This very elegantly puts the current 'instruction' to be at the outermost loop of any subroutines that were being enacted up to time λ. This would probably alter the nature of some of the results just mentioned. The following Lemma holds for both the standard 0, 1 valued 3 tape and 1 tape models, for an enumeration of the cells C i | i < ω . It also holds for the 1 tape model using blanks mutatis mutandis. Roughly speaking the tape's contents at a reasonably closed ordinal time γ is Σ 2 definable over L γ ; after a further ω many steps of calculation we expect to get a double (standard) Turing jump of that to be written to the tape. Hence Proof: First assume only that γ is a limit stage in the computation of P e (x). Let s 0 be the "snapshot" at stage γ; that is let s 0 code C i (γ)|i < ω . We note just as above that there is an (ordinary) Turing recursive total function F, so that if n < ω "F(s 0 n) = u" iff u is a sequence of length n representing the cell sequence C i (γ + n)|i < n after n stages of the operation of P e (x) beyond γ. Then
Now assume that γ is reasonably closed, for example, p.r. closed. Then
({α}).
Proof: We exhibit a formula demonstrating this: u = s 0 n ⇐⇒ Fun(u) ∧ dom(u) = n ∧ ranu ⊆ 2 ∪ B ∧ ∀i ∈ dom(u)
[(u(i) = j ∧ ∃γ < γ∀γ > γ(γ < γ −→ C i (γ ) = j) ∨ (u(i) = j = B ∧ ∀γ < γ∃γ > γ(γ < γ ∧ C i (γ ) = C i (γ + 1))] Q.E.D.Claim 3)
Claim 4) C m (γ + ω) = i < 2 ⇐⇒ ∃k < ω∀l > k(∀u((u = s 0 l) −→ (F(u)) m = 1)).
The formula on the right hand side of Claim 4) yields our result.
Theorem 9 There is a limit ordinal γ + ω which is the halting time of a 3 tape machine computation of the form P e (0) for some e; but which is not the halting time of any 1 tape machine program.
Proof: Let γ be least that is Π 3 -reflecting. Then γ is in fact an admissible limit of admissibles. (Any Π 2 reflecting ordinal is admissible, and the admissibility axioms themselves allow a Π 3 axiomatisation.) We note for later that L γ has no proper L α ≺ Σ 1 L γ substructures (for that it would have to be much more than Π n -reflecting for all n). Claim 1) γ is 3 tape clockable.
Proof: By the minimality of γ, it is not Π 4 -reflecting, i.e. there is a sentence σ and a Π 2 formula ψ(v 0 , v 1 ) so that σ ⇐⇒ ∀n∃mψ(n, m) is true at L γ but at no earlier level. We may assume (as we have done) that without loss of generality, the quantifiers in σ are natural number quantifiers (this again follows from the leastness assumptions on γ that every x ∈ L γ has a parameter free Σ 1 definition.) We run the algorithm P e above, of Case 3 of Lemma 9 which writes Σ 2 theories to a scratch tape. By the comment there, the admissibility of γ ensures that T 2 γ is indeed the tape's contents at time γ. We shall modify this procedure so that the resulting program halts at stage γ + ω. By the remark following the description of P e (concerning p.r. closed ordinals, and the fact that admissibles are limits of such), we shall have that the Flag of P e at stage γ is a '0'. We'll make the additional assumption that this Flag of P e was in fact the cell C 1 . We assume also we have left C 0 free for our use now. We add the condition that whenever the Flag (i.e. C 1 ) is 0, at a limit stage, which it recognises by being in the limit state, q l , we change it to 1, and also ensure that C 0 is 0 also; When additionally the Flag is '0' at a limit (as opposed to the flashing 1,0,1 at some successor stages in the above description of P e ) we then arrange to have inspected in the next ω many steps the current Σ 2 -truth set which we can assume is present on the tape as described above. We set up C 0 so that it flashes 0, 1 each time we find some 0, k 0 , 1, k 1 , . . . so that for some i ψ(i, k i ) appears in this truth set.
Subclaim At γ + ω we have C 1 = 1, C 0 = 0, and this is the first limit where this happens. Hence we can modify P e to halt exactly at stage γ + ω when this happens. Straightforward.
Q.E.D. Claim 1)
Claim 2) γ + ω is not 1 tape clockable. Proof: Deny for a contradiction. First suppose γ + ω was clockable via an algorithm that was programmed to halt when C 0 contained a 1 and thus it did so because ∃n∀m > n C 0 (γ + m) = 1. This is Σ 4 (L γ ), and also by Π 3 -reflection must reflect down to some γ < γ.
That is, C 0 (γ + ω) = j. Contradiction! Hence γ was clockable using an algorithm that halts on 0 and in which the contents of C 0 altered cofinally in γ + ω. Thus we must have for some 0 < n < ω "C 0 (γ + n) = C 0 (γ + n + 1)". This is ∆ 3 (L γ ) (see (3) of the proof of Lemma 10). By Π 3 -reflection we shall have that C 0 (γ + n) = C 0 (γ + n + 1) for unboundedly many γ < γ , for some γ < γ and the program would thus halt at such a γ .
Q.E.D. Claim 2)
For completeness we just additionally note: Claim 3) γ + ω + 1 is 1 tape clockable. Proof: With the extra step we can run the argument of (1) and inspect the cell C 1 and halt at the right point.
Q.E.D.Theorem 9
